Abstract. As agent systems grow larger and more complex, there is an increasing need to formally verify them. Furthermore, it is often suggested that complex systems can be regulated using organizational models, imposing constraints on the agents in the systems. Agents that can understand the organizational model and constraints in a system is said to be organization-aware. This paper is concerned with verification of organization-aware agents. We show how agents using AORTA, a framework for making agents organization-aware, can be formally verified using an extended version of the Agent Java PathFinder (AJPF), a model checking system designed specifically for agent programming languages. We integrate AORTA with the Agent Infrastructure Layer (AIL), which is an intermediate layer on top of which APLs can be implemented, and use our extension of AJPF to verify a system of agents aiming to write a paper together by using an organization for coordination.
Introduction
In many of the areas where multi-agent systems (MASs) are used, there is a need for dependability and security. Therefore, it is increasingly necessary to consider formal verification of such systems [4] . Furthermore, we have seen an increase of interest in the area of organization-oriented MAS, i.e. systems in which agents have to consider organizational constraints. The motivation for organizational MASs is the increasing complexity of heterogeneous agents in open systems. The owner of an open system cannot in general assume much about agents entering the system, and it is therefore important to be able to regulate their behavior to ensure that it is within the acceptable boundaries of the system.
Organizational models (e.g. Moise + [16] ) are designed to describe what is expected of agents in the system without taking the individual agents and their implementation into account. This is done using the notion of roles: an agent can a enact roles, giving it certain responsibilities (the objectives of the role) while providing certain capabilities (access to objects in the system, access to groups of other agents, etc.). Furthermore, organizational models often have a normative aspect: behavior, or states of affair, that is expected of the agents in making it possible to perform model checking on organization-aware agents. We evaluate the system in section 5 and we conclude the paper in section 6.
2 The AORTA framework AORTA [18] is an organizational reasoning component that can be integrated into an agent's reasoning mechanism, allowing it to reason about (and act upon) regulations specified by an organizational model using reasoning rules. That is, the organization is preexisting and independent from the agent and the component is agent-centered, focusing on letting the agent reason about the organization. By separating the organization from the agent, the architecture of the agent is independent from the organizational model, and the agent is free to decide on how to use AORTA in its reasoning. The separation is achieved by basing the component on reasoning rules using an organizational metamodel, designed to support different organizational models. A prototype of AORTA has been implemented in Java 1 [19] , designed such that it can provide organizational reasoning capabilities to agents implemented in existing APLs.
In this paper, we use an extended version of the AORTA architecture described in [19] : options are generated automatically, action deliberation and coordination are merged into a single phase, and we incorporate obligations. Organizational reasoning in AORTA is then divided into three phases: obligation check (OC), option generation (OG) and action execution (AE). The OC-phase uses the agent's mental state and organizational state to determine if obligations are activated, satisfied or violated, and updates the organizational state accordingly. The OG-phase uses the organizational specification to generate possible organizational options. The agent considers these options in the AE-phase using reasoning rules, which can alter the organizational state and the agent's intentions, or send messages to other agents. The component is shown in figure 1 . We assume is connected to a cognitive agent, i.e., agents with mental attitudes (such as beliefs and goals) and practical reasoning rules.
Checking obligations: In the OC-phase, AORTA uses the agent's state to determine for each obligation if it should change to a new state. We use conditional obligations with a deadline, so an obligation can change state in several different situations. If the condition for activating an obligation has happened, the component activates the obligation by updating the organizational state. Similarly, it checks whether the obligation has been satisfied (the objective is completed) or violated (the deadline was reached before the objective was completed). Role enactment: Roles that are possible to enact given the agent's goals. Role deactment: (Currently enacting) roles that have been fulfilled or are no longer useful. Obligations: States the agent is currently obliged to achieve. Delegation: Objectives that can be delegated based on a dependency relation. Information: Obtained information that other agents will benefit from knowing.
The options that are generated in this phase are then available to act upon in the AE-phase.
Action execution: The AE-phase uses reasoning rules to decide how to react on a given option in a given context. The AE-phase selects at most one option to act upon. The reasoning is based on rules of the form
where option is a previously generated option, context is a state description that should hold for an action to be applicable, and action is the action to be executed. The agent has actions available to enact or deact a role, commit to complete or drop an objective, and send messages. This corresponds to the options that can be generated in the previous phase.
The AORTA organizational metamodel
Reasoning in AORTA uses an organizational metamodel, which is based on roles, objectives and obligations, as these concepts are commonly used in existing organizational models (e.g. Moise + ). A role is defined only by its name and its main objectives. Sub-objectives of an objective are specified using obj-predicates. We distinguish between the different states of obligations by using different predicates. For example, a conditional obligation is represented by the predicate cond(borrower, return(Book ), Deadline, borrowed (Book )). If an agent Bob enacts the borrower role and borrows the book "1984", the obligation is activated, which is represented by the predicate obl(bob, borrower, return(1984 ), Deadline). A violation of the obligation is represented by the predicate viol(bob, borrower, return(1984 )).
Definition 1 (Organizational metamodel

Operational semantics of AORTA
The AORTA framework has a well-defined operational semantics, which has been implemented in Java and integrated with Jason. We will not go into details with the semantics in this paper, but give the relevant definitions required to understand our integration of AORTA with AIL.
One of the key ideas of AORTA is the notion of the organizational knowledge base used by the component for reasoning about options and actions. Furthermore, the component contains an options base containing the options generated in the OG-phase.
Definition 2 (Mental state). The AORTA mental state is based on knowledge bases. Each knowledge base is based on a predicate language, L, with typical formula φ. The agent's belief base and intention base are denoted Σ a and Γ a , respectively. The language of the organization is denoted L org , and L org ⊆ L, and the option language is denoted L opt , and L opt ⊆ L. The organizational specification and options are denoted Σ o and Γ o , respectively. The mental state, MS, is then a tuple of knowledge bases:
The option language, L opt with typical element γ is defined as follows:
where R is a role identifer, O is an objective, ilf is tell or achieve, and φ ∈ L is a message.
Each of the knowledge bases in the mental state can be queried using reasoning formulas.
Definition 4 (Formulas). AORTA uses reasoning formulas, L R , with typical element ρ, which are based on organizational formulas, option formulas, belief formulas and goal formulas:
where φ ∈ L.
Organizational formulas, org(φ), queries the organizational beliefs, option formulas, opt(φ), queries the options base, belief formulas, bel(φ), queries the belief base and goal formulas, goal(φ), queries the goal base.
Definition 5 (Semantics of reasoning formulas). The semantics are based on the agent's mental state, MS
We define the configuration of an agent with an AORTA component as follows:
Definition 6 (AORTA-agent). An AORTA-agent configuration is defined by the following tuple:
where α is the name of the agent, MS is the mental state, AR is the agents reasoning rules, AR ⊆ R A , F is the set of transition functions and µ = µ in , µ out is the mailbox, contains incoming and outgoing messages.
The initial configuration consists of a set of initial beliefs and goals, and the organizational specification. The agent has a number of state transition rules available, which can be used to change its state. The execution of an entire organizational cycle will check for messages and external changes, apply obligation rules, generate options and execute an action. Then, the reasoning cycle of the agent enriched with the component is executed (e.g. the Jason reasoning cycle).
Model Checking Agent Programming Languages
Much of the work done in the area of model checking MASs and agent programming languages has been in the setting of AgentSpeak(L) [5, 6, 7] . While interesting, such approaches are generally hard to extend to other languages without a lot of hard work. Furthermore, verification of heterogeneous MASs 3 is not possible. Recently, others have proposed a way to verify heterogeneous MASs by translating programs into a common metalanguage, meta-APL [13] . However, since this approach requires a translation of the program, we need to convince ourselves that the translation is faithful to the original program.
In this paper, we are focusing on another approach for verifying agent systems, which is based on an extended version of Java PathFinder (JPF) [22] called Agent JPF (AJPF), which takes advantage of the advanced model checking features of JPF, while making it possible to verify properties relevant to intelligent agents. AJPF can be used as-is for potentially any APL implemented in Java, but its real power shows, when combined with the agent infrastructure layer (AIL). AIL is designed so that interpreters of semantically well-defined agent programming languages can be implemented using it [11] , and has been optimized for model checking in AJPF, by using techniques such as state-space reduction. AIL comes with a simple APL, Gwendolen [10] , which provides the default semantics for AIL. An AIL agent has a belief base, possibly a rule base, goals, plans and intentions. Furthermore, the agent has a reasoning cycle, which executes the implementation of the operational semantics. We will not go into details with all the different components of AIL, but refer to [11] for a detailed description.
Specifying properties
Model checking agent systems is only useful, if we can specify desirable properties in a language that can incorporate the mental attitudes of agents. In AJPF, these properties are specified in the property specification language (PSL) [11] . PSL is a linear-time temporal logic (LTL) with additional modal operators for beliefs, goals, intentions, actions and percepts. We can thus specify formulas that should hold in the system.
The full PSL syntax is given below. ag is the agent's name, f is a ground first-order atomic formula.
is true if agent ag believes f to be true, G(ag, f ) is true if the agent has f as a goal. A represents actions, I intentions and P properties of the environment. The LTL formulas U and R represents "until" and "release", respectively. The temporal operators ✸ (eventually) and ✷ (always) can be derived from U and R.
The underlying semantics of the modal operators depends on the MAS being verified. When using AORTA we can specify the semantics of beliefs as follows:
where MAS is the multi-agent system, and MS ag is agent ag's mental state as defined in section 2. The semantics of the other modal operators can be given in a similar way.
AJPF
Agent JPF is a module for the Java PathFinder [22] . JPF consists of an implementation of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), which can execute all paths through a program in order to verify some predefined properties about the program. Since the state space often explodes, JPF employs state matching in order to reduce the number of states explored.
AJPF implements a controller, which takes care of execution of each of the agents in the system. At each time step, it checks whether the system is in an end state 4 and should terminate, and otherwise it decides which agent to execute. This decision is made by a scheduler, which keeps a list of active agents, i.e. agents that do not want to sleep. The model checker can then branch out at each of these states and execute each of the active agents (by choosing one path, executing it until reaching an end state and then backtracking).
Each agent in an APL (either an AIL-enabled or an existing APL) needs to implement the MCAPLLanguageAgent interface, which is used by AJPF to perform all the steps necessary for the verification of a system: -Perform a reasoning step (MCAPLreason()).
-Decide to put the agent to sleep (MCAPLwantstosleep()) or wake it up (MCAPLwakeup()).
-Check if a property holds (MCAPLbelieves(fml), MCAPLhasGoal(fml), etc.). AJPF provides a listener, which is used to verify the properties specified in PSL. This can be done by first building a Büchi automaton that represents the property, and then compute the global behavior of the system by executing it. The product of these, the product automaton, can then be used to check if the property is violated. A property is violated if there exists a path to an accepting state [8] . The implementation of the model checker in AJPF employs techniques that allows progressively building the product automaton [14] , making the verification process more efficient.
Verification of Organizations in Multi-Agent Systems
In the previous section, we described the AJPF framework, which can be used for verification of MASs. We now turn to verification of organizational MASs.
In [12] , several desirable properties of organizational MASs were define: what makes an organization well-defined, good, effective, etc. These properties require not only a way to express the beliefs of the agents in the system, but also the state of the organization. For example, a good organization "is an organization such that if the organization has the capability to achieve φ and there is a group of roles in the organization responsible for realizing it, then the roles being in charge have a chain of delegation to roles that are played by agents in A i that are actually capable of achieving it" [12] . Being able to verify that a system satisfies these properties would be a large step towards convincing oneself that the system actually works. Verification of organizational aspects has been investigated before [1, 9, 17, 21] , but usually only by considering the internals of each agent as a black box. Model checking of electronic institutions specified in the ISLANDER framework was explored in [17] . By translating an ISLANDER specification into MABLE, a language for automatic verification of MASs, the system can be verified using the SPIN model checker.
The work most similar to ours is described in [9] , where a programming language for normative MASs is implemented in AIL. Agents in the system can interact with an organization, and the system can then verify various properties of both the agents and the organization. Our integration with AIL differs in that we only verify properties of the agents, but these properties may include organizational properties, as defined in the AORTA component. Since AORTA is not tightly coupled to a specific APL, the integration with AIL allows us to perform verification of existing agents with additional properties concerning an organization.
In the remainder of this section, we show how AORTA can be integrated into AIL, such that 1) interpreters implemented in AIL can make use of AORTA, and 2) verification of these systems is possible using AJPF 5 .
Specifying organizational properties
In order to verify properties about organizational beliefs and options, we need to be able to express the properties in PSL. We therefore extend the PSL syntax to incorporate such properties:
The interpretation of Org(ag, f ) is given as:
where MAS is the multi-agent system (AIL+AORTA) and MS ag is agent ag's mental state as defined in section 2. Similarly, the interpretation of Opt(ag, f ) is:
In AJPF, we have implemented the extended PSL by adding functions checking whether an agent has organizational beliefs or options to the MCAPLLanguageAgent interface, which defines the methods needed by AJPF to perform model checking.
Verifying AORTA
Verification of the agents with an AORTA component requires (1) an integration of the AORTA architecture within existing AIL agents, and (2) the ability to verify properties about organizational beliefs and organizational options.
We have integrated the AORTA architecture in AIL, allowing existing interpreters implemented in AIL to take advantage of the AORTA organizational reasoning component. The AortaAILAgent extends the AILAgent class as follows: We have furthermore implemented an AILBridge, which is responsible for updating the AIL agent, when AORTA performs actions that change the belief base or goal base.
Evaluation of AIL+AORTA
In this section, we evaluate our integration of AORTA in AIL. As we shall see, the example is small enough to generate the entire state space within reasonble time (takes approximately 10 minutes), so we evaluate the system in two ways:
1. We generate the product automata on the fly by executing the agent system, while verifying each of the properties. 2. We first generate the entire state space for the system, and use it to verify each of the properties.
The first method is practical for large (possible infinite) systems, or properties that can be verified quickly (e.g. that the agents eventually enacts a role, since this is the first thing happening in our system). The second method is practical :name: bob : I n i t i a l B e l i e f s : : B e l i e f R u l e s : : I n i t i a l G o a l s : writer [ achieve ] : P l a n s : +! writer [ achieve ] : { True } <-+ writer ; +! wsec [ achieve ] : { True } <-+ wsec ; +! wref [ achieve ] : { True } <-+ wref ;
for verifying many properties in a single, finite system, since the time used for verification of each property is significantly lower than the time spend generating the state space.
Example: Writing a paper
To illustrate the capabilities of the model checker for AIL+AORTA, we use a simple example of a group of agents aiming to write a scientific paper using an organizational specification to help them collaborate (inspired by [15] ). In the example, an editor should create a first draft version (fdv ), consisting of a title (wtitle) and an abstract (wabs) and the section titles (wsectitle). The submission version (sv ) is then created by letting a number of writers write the sections (wsec) and the references (wref ), while the editor writes the conclusion (wconc). The writers depend on the editor for the completion of fdv, while the editor depends on the writers for the completion of wsec and wref. We consider two agents: Alice, capable of editing the paper and Bob, capable of being a writer. We have implemented the agents in Gwendolen. The implementation of the agents is shown in listing 1. Since the focus is not on verification of agents writing a paper, but rather on the organizational coordination mechanisms of AORTA, the implementation of each objective is very simple. Note that the initial goals of each agent are artificial goals, which are used to generate a role enactment option, since AORTA currently only supports generating role enactment options based on the agent's goals.
The agents are enriched with an AORTA component that enables them to enact roles, commit to objectives and coordinate. The AORTA-program for the agents is shown in listing 2. The agents are able to delegate goals (the send(R, : bel ( me ( Me ) , agent ( Ag ) , Ag \= Me ) , ∼( bel ( sent ( Ag , org ( rea ( Me , R ))))) = > send ( Ag , org ( rea ( Me , R ))). send (R , achieve , O )
: org ( rea ( Ag , R )) , bel ( me ( Me ) , Ag \= Me ) , ∼( bel ( sent ( Ag , goal ( O )))) = > send ( Ag , goal ( O )). send (R , tell , O )
: org ( rea ( Ag , R )) , bel ( me ( Me ) , Ag \= Me ) , ∼( bel ( sent ( Ag , bel ( O )))) = > send ( Ag , bel ( O )).
achieve, O) option) and inform about completion of goals (the send(R, tell, O) option). They commit to objectives that they are obliged to complete, and for simplicity simply enact a role, if it is considered an option.
Main results
Our system was evaluated 6 using the properties listed in table 1. Our results are divided into two sets: 1) the on the fly verification, for which we specify the number of states explored and the time used, and 2) the complete state space verification, in which we only state the time used, since in that case, the number of states is constant (the example contains 251 states).
Properties 1 and 2 check that the agents eventually enacts their roles. Property 3 tries to verify that Alice eventually enacts the writer role, but fails, since that is not the case. Properties 4 and 5 check that the agents furthermore eventually knows about the other agent's enactment. Property 7 verifies that whenever Alice is obliged to achieve wabs, she will eventually believe that she has achieved it. Property 9 verifies that when Alice believes she has completed fdv, she will eventually inform Bob, because of the dependency relation between their roles. Finally, property 11 verifies that the paper is eventually written. Note that the time difference between properties 1 and 2 are due to the way the AJPF scheduler executes the agents: Bob is only executed once AJPF has detected that Alice has nothing more to do.
Since the time complexity of LTL model checking is exponential in the length of the formula [2] , we furthermore verified larger formulas to get an assessment of the model checker's capabilities. Property 6 verifies that the agents know their own role and the role of the other agent. Property 8 verifies that for every obligation it is the case that it is eventually satisfied. Property 10 verifies that all dependency relations are used for generating options, and finally, 12 verifies all of the properties above.
As expected, once the state space has been fully generated, verification of each property is quite fast. We also see that verification of larger formulas takes much more time (e.g. property 8 compared to property 7), which is expected, Table 1 . The properties that were verified by AJPF. The results are specified for 1) the on the fly verification and 2) the complete state space verification. since the formulas are LTL formulas. Obviously, generating the entire model beforehand is only necessary, when we want to validate several properties, since in several of the cases, the entire state space does not need to be explored. Our experiments have further shown that one execution of an AORTA cycle is on average 10 times slower when executed using JPF compared to executing the system on the host JVM (i.e. without running the verification process). Even though some decrease in performance is expected, it should be possible to improve this by implementing the operational semantics of AORTA using AIL. In that case, we have to convince ourselves that the semantics are correctly implemented in AIL (i.e., the functionality should correspond to the functionality of the existing implementation). Still, the advantage of verifying the existing implementation is that the results are directly applicable (i.e., we know that the agents will inform each other about their roles, that they will conform with their obligations, etc.).
In section 4, we mentioned that an organization could be considered good if the roles are related in such a way that the objectives of the organization will be delegated to the agents that can actually achieve them. We cannot directly specify general properties like this in PSL, so instead, they must be specified using the specific properties relevant to the given system. In our case, we can specify this using the dependency relations (property 10) and the fact that the paper is eventually written (property 11). Using the organizational model and the agent programs it should be possible to generate such specifications, but that is out of scope for this paper.
Conclusion
As agent systems gain popularity and become increasingly complex, the possibility to understand every part of a system becomes difficult. By model checking agent systems, it will be possible to verify that the agents of the system behave as expected and that the outcome is satisfactory. We have discussed some of the work done concerning model checking of agent programming languages, focusing especially on the generic Agent Java PathFinder, which enables model checking of potentially any kind of agent programming language. Furthermore, by allowing the implementation of an APL interpreter within AJPF (using the Agent Infrastructure Layer), it is possible to optimize the model checking process, making it feasible for larger systems.
In increasingly complex systems, there is often a need for regulation, since agents may come from different sources and cannot as such be forced to perform actions required to achieve the system objectives. This further creates a need for model checking, since the complexity again increases. In this paper, we have shown that our framework for organizational reasoning, AORTA, can be model checked using an extended version of AJPF. We have integrated AORTA in AIL and have verified properties about a system implemented in an APL using AORTA for organizational reasoning. We have verified that the agents of the system enacts roles, coordinate role enactment and that they can successfully delegate tasks using an organizational model describing roles and their relations.
The AORTA framework is not tightly integrated with AIL, but is rather used as a library, which means that many of the optimization techniques of AJPF cannot be used. Furthermore, a single step of the AORTA reasoning cycle is considered atomic in the current implementation, making it impossible to verify properties about the internals of AORTA. Even though the system, in its current state, makes it possible to verify interesting properties about a system, it would be interesting to address these shortcomings in the future. However, as we have mentioned, even though the advantages of implementing the operational semantics of AORTA in AIL rather than using it as a library are desirable, they should be weighed against the drawback of not verifying the actual system, but a (hopefully) equivalent one (in terms of operational semantics). We believe that both approaches have their merits, and an implementation of the operational semantics in AIL will be also a useful contribution to model checking of organization-aware agents. An obvious direction for future work is thus to implement the operational semantics in AIL.
Finally, even though the example used in this paper shows that it is possible to verify properties about organization-aware agents, it is rather small and it would be interesting to verify larger, more complex systems containing more than a handful of agents.
